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TWO DECADES OF LAWS AND PRACTICE AROUND 
SCREEN SCRAPING IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD 
AND ITS OPEN BANKING WATERSHED MOMENT 
Han-Wei Liu† 
Abstract: Screen scraping—a technique using an agent to collect, parse, and 
organize data from the web in an automated manner—has found countless applications 
over the past two decades. It is now employed everywhere, from targeted advertising, 
price aggregation, budgeting apps, website preservation, academic research, and 
journalism, to name a few. However, this tool has raised enormous controversy in the 
age of big data. This article takes a comparative law approach to explore two sets of 
analytical issues in three common law jurisdictions, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia. As the first step, this article maps out the trajectory of 
relevant laws and jurisprudence around screen scraping legality in three common law 
jurisdictions—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Specifically, the 
article focuses on five selected issue areas within those jurisdictions—“digital 
trespass” statutes, tort, intellectual property rights, contract, and data protection. Our 
findings reveal some level of divergence in the way each country addresses the legality 
of screen scraping. Despite such divergence, one may see a sea change amid the trend 
of data-sharing under the banner of “Open Banking” in coming years. This article 
argues that to the extent that these data sharing initiatives enable information flow 
between entities, it could reduce the demand for screen scraping generally, thereby 
bringing some level of convergence. Yet, this convergence is qualified by the 
institutional design of data sharing schemes—whether or not it explicitly addresses 
screen scraping (as in Australia and the United Kingdom) and whether there is a top-
down, government-mandated data-sharing regime (as in the United States). 
Cite as: Han-Wei Liu, Two Decades of Laws and Practice Around Screen 
Scraping in the Common Law World and its Open Banking Watershed 
Moment, 30 WASH. INT’L L.J. 28 (2020).  
INTRODUCTION 
Text and data mining are, broadly speaking, overarching terms 
covering a range of techniques to extract useful information and explore 
patterns in data that might not be identified otherwise. 1  One popular 
technique is “screen scraping”—also known as “web scraping,” “data 
scraping,” “web data extraction,” or “web data mining”—which refers to 
constructing “an agent to download, parse, and organize data from the web 
in an automated manner.”2 Put differently, screen scraping uses a software 
agent to mimic browsing interactions between web servers and people.3  
 
†
  Dr. Han-Wei Liu, Lecturer (Assistant Professor), Monash University, Australia. The author is 
grateful for Tiana Moutafis and Lily Raynes for excellent research assistance. 
1  See generally RONEN FELDMAN & JAMES SANGER, THE TEXT MINING HANDBOOK: ADVANCED 
APPROACHES IN ANALYZING UNSTRUCTURED DATA (2006). 
2  The terms “web scraping” and “web crawling” are sometimes used interchangeably. Some data 
scientists remark that although the difference is vague, the term “crawler” means that a “program’s ability 
to navigate web pages on its own, perhaps even without a well-defined end goal or purpose, endlessly 
exploring what a site or the web has to offer.” SEPPE VANDEN BROUCKE & BART BAESENS, PRACTICAL 
WEB SCRAPING FOR DATA SCIENCE: BEST PRACTICES AND EXAMPLES WITH PYTHON 3, 155 (2018). 
3  Daniel Glez-Peña et al., Web Scraping Technologies in an API World, BRIEFING IN 
BIOINFORMATICS 788, 789 (2014) (describing web scraping as “[s]tep by step, the robot accesses as many 
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The practice is nothing new.4 Screen scraping technology was used 
in the “account aggregation” services that emerged in the United States in 
the late 1990s.5 These services enable clients to view account information 
from various institutions in one place.6 They may either collate financial 
data (e.g., from deposit accounts, credit accounts, and managed funds 
accounts)7 or non-financial data (e.g., from email accounts and frequent 
flyer accounts).8 This business model has since diffused throughout Europe 
and the Asia-Pacific.9 As early as 2000, for instance, Australia had seven 
firms providing data aggregation services—among them financial 
institutions, a stockbroker, and an app development company.10 This era 
also marked the emergence of search engines such as Google, which use 
scraping bots that pull small amounts of data (i.e., the search terms entered) 
to link a user to relevant webpages.11  
Screen scraping has since been applied in different contexts. It is 
now used for targeted advertising,12 price aggregation,13 budgeting apps,14 
website preservation, 15  academic research, 16  journalism, 17  and more. 18 
Analytic start-ups draw insights for industries by scraping public data,19 
 
Web sites as needed, parses their contents to find and extract data of interest and structures those contents 
as desired”). 
4  Jeffrey Kenneth Hirschey, Symbiotic Relationships: Pragmatic Acceptance of Data Scraping, 
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 903 (2014). 
5  Australian Securities & Investment Commission (ASIC), CONSULTATION PAPER 20: ACCOUNT 
AGGREGATION IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR 1 (2001) [hereinafter ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 
20]. 
6  Id. at 9. 
7  Id. at 19. 
8  Id. at 22.  
9  See, e.g., Hiroshi Fujii et. al., E-Aggregation: The Present and Future of Online Financial 
Services in Asia-Pacific (MIT Sloan School of Management, Working Paper CISL#2002-06), 
http://web.mit.edu/smadnick/www/wp/2002-06.pdf. 
10  ASIC CONSULTATION PAPER 20, supra note 5, at 16–17. 
11  Hirschey, supra note 4, at 898. “Bots” refer to an automated program designed to carry out a 
specific task or simulate a human activity. Paris Martineau, What is a Bot?, WIRED, (Nov. 16, 2018) 
https://www.wired.com/story/the-know-it-alls-what-is-a-bot/. 
12  Myra F. Din, Breaching and Entering: When Data Scraping Should Be a Federal Computer 
Hacking Crime, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 405, 408 (2015). 
13  Id. at 408. 
14  Id.; Tess Macapinlac, The Legality of Web Scraping: A Proposal, 71 FED. COMM. L.J. 399, 402 
(2019). 
15  Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 24 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 372, 374 (2018). 
16  Macapinlac, supra note 14, at 402. 
17  Jacquellena Carrero, Access Granted: A First Amendment Theory of Reform of the CFAA Access 
Provision, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 146 (2020). 
18  See, e.g., Sellars, supra note 15, at 374. 
19  Ioannis Drivas, Liability for Data Scraping Prohibitions under the Refusal to Deal Doctrine: 
An Incremental Step toward More Robust Sherman Act Enforcement, 86 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1901, 1903–
04 (2019). 
30 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 30 NO. 1 
while Fintech 20  firms purchase data made available by aggregators to 
develop new products and services.21 There is, therefore, an increasingly 
complex symbiotic relationship between scrapers and data hosts, with 
many scraping services benefitting both parties.22 Given their everyday use 
for a wide range of commercial and non-commercial purposes, scraping 
bots are estimated to account for nearly a quarter of all internet traffic.23  
However, screen scraping can be controversial. It can be detrimental 
to the data host and consumer.24 Scraping is parasitic when it undercuts a 
website’s revenue by republishing data without requiring users to view 
supporting advertisements. 25  It can facilitate copyright infringement at 
scale26 or even impact the data host’s services by overloading servers.27 
Screen scraping can also raise privacy concerns for consumers if it collects 
identifiable information or enables new forms of surveillance. 28  In the 
banking context—where login credentials may be shared to allow the 
scraping of account data—there are additional concerns relating to 
cybersecurity, data breach, and liability allocation for unauthorized 
transactions.29 These problematic applications of screen scraping have led 
to litigation against scrapers—most notably in the United States.  
This article’s aim is two-fold. First, it seeks to maps the trajectory of 
relevant laws and jurisprudence around the legality of screen scraping in 
three common law jurisdictions and contrasts how one may challenge it 
differently. Second, it assesses the extent to which a new development—
Open Banking—may affect screen scraping’s legal landscape 
More specifically, regarding the trajectory of relevant laws, Section 
II of this article focuses on five selected issue areas—digital trespass (or 
hacking) statutes, tort, intellectual property rights (IPR), contractual rights, 
and privacy/data protection in the United States, United Kingdom, and 
 
20  Fintech is a contraction of “financial technology” that refers to technology-enabled financial 
solutions. See Brian Hurh et. al., Consumer Financial Data Aggregation and the Potential for 
Regulatory Intervention, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 20, 21 (2017).  
21  See Douglas W. Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO. 
J. INT’L L. 1271, 1271 (2016). 
22  Hirschey, supra note 4, at 897–98. 
23  Macapinlac, supra note 14, at 402; Drivas, supra note 19, at 1903–04. 
24  Nabeel Hasan Saeed, Good or Evil? What Web Scraping Bots Mean for Your Site?, IMPERVA, 
(Apr. 18, 2016) https://www.imperva.com/blog/web-scraping-bots/ (“Database scraping can be used to 
steal intellectual property, price lists, customer lists, insurance pricing and other datasets that would 
require an effort prohibitively tedious for humans, but perfectly within the range of what bots routinely 
do.”); see also Hirschey, supra note 4, at 898–99. 
25  Id. 
26  Sellars, supra note 15, at 374–75. 
27  Hirschey, supra note 4, at 898–99. 
28  Id.; Sellars, supra note 15, at 374–75. 
29  ASIC Consultation Paper 20, supra note 5, at 46; BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
REPORT ON OPEN BANKING AND APPLICATION PROGRAMMING INTERFACES 12, 14 (Nov. 2019).  
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Australia.30 This article argues that the use of tort law, in the form of a 
“trespass to chattels” claim, is more likely to succeed in the United States 
than in the United Kingdom or Australia. The Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act is also a handy tool for litigating against scrapers in the United States, 
despite the vague and evolving concept of “authorized” access. In the other 
two jurisdictions, similar legislation is either absent (in Australia) or has 
not been applied for this purpose (in the United Kingdom). By contrast, 
intellectual property infringement claims are more likely to succeed in the 
United Kingdom given the existence of a “database right,” which does not 
exist in the other two states. There is room for claims based on contractual 
rights (as derived from a website’s Terms of Use) in all three common law 
jurisdictions. However, in Australia, such claims may be the “first line of 
defense” against screen scraping given the absence of a hacking statute or 
database right.31 Finally, scraping personally identifiable information (PII) 
may breach privacy/data protection in Australia and the United Kingdom, 
but no comprehensive data privacy legislation exists in the United States 
at the federal level yet.  
The article continues in Section III, arguing that despite the 
jurisdictional divergence in how this technology is treated, Open Banking 
initiatives’ rise in recent years could moderate concerns and bring a certain 
level of convergence. This article’s analysis shows that to the extent Open 
Banking mandates or facilitates data sharing, it could reduce the need for 
screen scraping. This is especially so in the European context—and even 
more so if the United Kingdom’s Smart Data initiative expands these data-
sharing principles beyond the financial sector. Conversely, the financial 
data-sharing environment is less clear in the United States, which lags in 
building up Open Banking. Australia lies in the middle of these two 
extremes: it has a comprehensive Consumer Data Rights (CDR) regime 
that can theoretically reduce screen scraping needs.32 But, given the fact 
that it imposes no ban on screen scraping (unlike the European Union or 
the United Kingdom), it has a loophole for data miners to work around the 
new regime and continue scraping data.  
 
30  Two caveats are in order. First, while screen scraping also raises antitrust or competition law 
concerns, these issues are not the focal point of this paper because they are complicated enough to be 
addressed in different scholarship. Second, for the purpose of this article, we use the terms “privacy” 
and “data protection” interchangeably, while acknowledging that they may be understood differently 
across contexts. For instance, in the context of the United States, the term privacy is read by the courts 
broadly enough to cover not only data protection but a wide range of rights, such as the right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure by governments and right to make private decisions like abortion 
or contraception. Hence, some suggest that it is more precise to use the term “data protection.” COLIN J. 
BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED 
STATES 12–14 (1st ed. 1992). 
31  Lesley Sutton et. al., Screen Scraping: Legal or Not?, GILBERT & TOBIN (Apr. 14, 2020), 
https://www.gtlaw.com.au/insights/screen-scraping-legal-or-not. 
32  The Treasury Laws Amendment (Consumer Data Right) Act 2019 (Cth) (Austl.).  
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I. CONTROVERSY AROUND SCREEN SCRAPING: A DIVERGENT COMMON 
LAW WORLD 
Legal claims to prevent screen scraping vary between the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Australia. The United States has developed 
more jurisprudence in the area. However, there is still a relatively small 
amount of legal scholarship addressing screen scraping—especially from 
the comparative law perspective. Notable aspects of each jurisdiction’s 
legal claims are discussed below.  
A. The United States’ Approach Towards Screen Scraping 
While screen scraping is not explicitly addressed in the United States’ 
legislation, it has been heatedly debated in considerable case law. The 
following discussion illustrates this development, dividing four major 
claims into sub-sections: (i) contravention of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (CFAA), (ii) trespass to chattels, (iii) compilation copyright 
infringement, and (iv) breach of contract.33 
1. Contravention of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. — In 1986, 
the United States enacted the CFAA, which amended various parts of 18 
U.S.C. §1030 (“Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with 
Computers”).34 This cybersecurity statute was later expanded to allow for 
civil liability,35 creating an avenue for relief to harmed individuals seeking 
compensatory damages, or injunctive relief and other equitable remedies.36 
The CFAA’s centerpiece is its prohibition on hacking, which occurs when 
a person “ intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or 
exceeds authorized access and thereby obtains…information from any 
 
33  Arguably, there are other causes of actions that are less common, like trademark infringement, 
unfair competition, misappropriation, intentional interference with contractual relationship, and trade 
secret-related claims. See, e.g., Hirschey, supra note 4, at 903; Vlad Krotov & Leiser Silva, Legality and 
Ethics of Web Scraping 3 (2018); Amber Zamora, Making Room for Big Data: Web Scraping and an 
Affirmative Right to Access Publicly Available Information Online, 12 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 
203, 205 (2019). 
34  Tess Macapinlac, The Legality of Web Scraping: A Proposal, 71 FED. COMM. L.J. 399, 403 
(2019); Samantha Jensen, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad Interpretations of 
the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 89 (2014). 
35  Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2097; Myra F. Din, 
Breaching and Entering: When Data Scraping Should Be a Federal Computer Hacking Crime, 81 
BROOK. L. REV. 405, 416 (2015); Kathleen C. Riley, Data Scraping as a Cause of Action: Limiting Use 
of the CFAA and Trespass in Online Copying Cases, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
245, 266–67 (2019); Jensen, supra note 34, at 85; Andrew Hernacki, A Vague Law in A Smartphone 
World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1543, 1550 (2012). 
36  18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (1984). Parties may obtain relief under these provisions if they demonstrate 
that they suffered a loss during a one-year period aggregating to at least $5,000 in value. Id. While there 
are other grounds for a civil action, they do not seem to arise in scraping cases. See Andrew Sellars, 
Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 372, 
376 (2018). 
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protected computer.”37 Yet, the term “authorization” is left undefined, 
and the United States’ courts have varying interpretations of it, as detailed 
in the sections that follow. In this regard, the best way to understand the 
trajectory of screen scraping jurisprudence under the CFAA is through the 
analytical framework offered by Andrew Sellars.38 
(a) Evolving Judicial Interpretation of “Authorization.” — The 
CFAA was introduced before web scrapers or the internet ever existed. 
Therefore, the act does not explicitly refer to screen scraping. 39 
Nonetheless, the CFAA has been invoked in litigation against scraping 
since the early 2000s.40 Courts’ approaches can roughly be divided into 
four phases.41 After broad application in Phase I, which involved a decade 
of litigation, the CFAA’s interpretation shifted to a narrower reading in the 
late 2000s—Phase II.42 Phase III began in the mid-2010s, wherein CFAA’s 
reading expanded again.43 Recent decisions—Phase IV—have narrowed 
the CFAA more, making it harder to stop scrapers from accessing public 
websites.44  
In Phase I—roughly from the turn of the millennium to 2009—
courts adopted an expansive view of the CFAA,45 under which a website 
only had to point to a mechanism that indicated the scraper’s access was 
“unauthorized,” whether contractual, technical or otherwise.46 Any signal 
of a website’s disapproval could have provided sufficient notice to scrapers 
that subsequent access would be “unauthorized” and breach the Act.47 
These signals included breaching a term of service,48 accessing a public 
website after express warnings to stay away,49 and even the complaint 
 
37  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (1984); The term “protected computer” broadly encompasses any 
computer that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication. 18 USC § 1030(e)(2)(B); H. 
MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 4 (2nd ed. 2015). 
38  Andrew Sellers is Director of the Technology Clinic at the Boston University School of Law. 
Sellars, supra note 15, at 377. 
39  Macapinlac, supra note 14, at 404, 412, 422. 
40  See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Sellars, 
supra note 15, at 388. 
41  Sellars, supra note 15, at 379–81. 
42  Id.  
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 380–81. 
45  Phase I refers to period from the eBay v. Bidder’s Edge decision in 2000 to the LVRC Holdings 
LLC v. Brekka decision in 2009. eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. at 1070; LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 
F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
46  Sellars, supra note 15, at 379; “Technical” barriers include click-through agreements, IP 
address blockers and robot exclusion protocols. Drivas, supra note 19, at 1904–05. Contrast this with 
“non-technical” measures such as website “terms and conditions” and cease-and-desist letters. Id. 
47  Sellars, supra note 15, at 394. 
48  Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 439 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (terms of 
use banned “any deep-link, page-scrape, robot, spider or other automatic device, program, algorithm or 
methodology which does the same things.”). 
49  Id. at 439–40. 
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filing itself.50 In two cases, the court suggested that a well-deployed terms 
of use notice on the website could adequately signal the extent of users’ 
authorized access on the site.51 Overall, there was no limitation on what 
could inform authorization, with Sellars identifying the decade as “a very 
uncertain time for web scrapers.”52  
As Sellars observed, Phase II started in 2009, when the United States’ 
courts began adopting a narrower view of the CFAA.53 Courts rejected 
claims against scrapers where a website merely placed restrictions on their 
website’s data usage, rather than limitations on site access, and interpreted 
the scope of a scraper’s authorization by referencing code-based controls 
(rather than those set by contract or principles of duty). 54  With this 
understanding, courts denied the use of a website’s terms of use to support 
a CFAA claim, as such contractual terms usually only imparted “use 
restrictions”—that is, limiting what can be done with the information after 
one arrives rather than “access restrictions.” 55  In Cvent v. Eventbrite, 
although the website’s terms of use prohibited competitors from accessing 
information, it had not taken any meaningful steps to block its competitors 
from doing so.56 Web scraping of the publicly available site was thus not a 
CFAA breach, as anyone, including competitors, could search and access 
the plaintiff’s information at will.57 This higher threshold of liability was 
reinforced by a 2010 decision in Facebook v. Power Ventures. There, the 
court clarified that terms of use and cease-and-desist notices were 
insufficient by themselves to show liability on the scraper’s part.58 The 
 
50  Sellars, supra note 15, at 394 n.163 (quoting Register.com v. Verio, 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)) (“[I]t is clear since at least the date this lawsuit was filed that Register.com does not 
consent to Verio's use of a search robot[.]”). 
51  Id. at 395 (citing Zefer, 318 F.3d at 63; Healthcare Advocates, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 649).  
52  Id. at 393, 395. 
53  Id. at 380.  
54 Id. at 379, 396. Under the code-based interpretation of “authorization,” user authorization is 
based on the operation of the computer system. Access would be unauthorized, and thus unlawful, if the 
user purposefully circumvents code-based protections (i.e., computer passwords) to gain access to or use 
the device in a way that would otherwise not be accessible. This approach can be dated back to the earlier 
CFAA cases such as United States v. Morris. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991). On 
this issue, see, e.g., Katherine Mesenbring Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees’ 
Authorization under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 825 (2009) and Orin S. 
Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1642 (2003) [hereinafter Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope]. 
55  Sellars, supra note 15, at 379, 398. 
56  Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 927, 932–33 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“Cvent’s website, 
including its CNS database, is therefore not protected in any meaningful fashion by its Terms of Use or 
otherwise”). 
57  Id. 
58  Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750, at *11 (N.D. 
Cal. July 20, 2010). The Court discussed how imposing criminal liability on the basis of TOU or a cease-
and-desist letter would grant the data host the ability to define the scope of federal criminality, which it 
found “constitutionally untenable.” Id. Users cannot have adequate notice of what actions will or will 
not expose them to criminal liability given that a website administrator “can unilaterally change the rules 
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court explained that using a website’s terms of use to determine 
authorization would “create a constitutionally untenable situation in which 
criminal penalties could be meted out on the basis of violating vague or 
ambiguous terms of use.”59 Instead, the primary issue was whether the 
scraper evaded technical or code-based barriers in accessing the 
information.60 In short, while scrapers still faced potential liability in Phase 
II (2009–13), they could successfully defend a lawsuit by arguing that the 
plaintiff’s mechanism was merely a “use restriction” or that the 
authorization mechanism should have been more code-based to have legal 
effect.61  
The advent of Phase III in 2013 reversed this narrowing trend—the 
courts broadened the CFAA’s interpretation with the revocation theory.62 
Beginning with Craigslist v. 3Taps, Craigslist filed a lawsuit against a 
company that scraped, aggregated, and republished its advertisements.63 
While 3Taps argued that everyone was authorized to access Craigslist, a 
public website, the court nevertheless found that Craigslist had revoked 
3Tap’s default authorization by sending multiple cease-and-desist letters 
and blocking its IP addresses.64 The court found these measures to be 
effective notices of revocation and thus subsequent scraping was a 
violation of the CFAA.65 Under the revocation theory, a website could 
establish liability if it demonstrated that it “revoked” access to the scraper 
at some point and that the scraper knew they had notice of the revoked 
access but continued to access the site.66 This theory broadened what could 
constitute “without authorization” under the CFAA. Now, any action by a 
 
at any time and are under no obligation to make the terms of use specific or understandable to the general 
public.” Id. The court contrasted this to a scraper evading technical or code-based barriers: such access 
crosses a clear demarcation that has been erected by the website administrator “to restrict the user’s 
privileges within the system,” and a person applying the technical skill necessary to overcome such a 
barrier “will almost always understand that any access gained through such action is unauthorized.” Id. 
Thus, accessing a computer network or website in a manner that overcomes technical or code-based 
barriers is “without permission” or “without authorization,” and may subject a user to liability under the 
Act. Id. 
59 Id. 
60  Id. This case was decided based on California Penal Code § 502, which is California’s analogue 
to the CFAA. Id. at 7. It was held that the fact that Power Venture’s scraping activities breached 
Facebook’s TOU did not mean that they had contravened the statute. Id. at 12. Yet, to the extent that 
Facebook could prove that Power Ventures circumvented technical barriers, it could be held liable for 
violating the statute. Id. Two years later, Facebook was granted summary judgment after it showed that 
Power Ventures did indeed circumvent technical barriers by deliberately evading IP address blocks. 
Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
61  Sellars, supra note 15, at 401.  
62  Id. at 380. 
63  Craigslist, Inc. v. 3Taps, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“Craigslist alleges 
that 3Taps copies (or “scrapes”) all content posted to Craigslist in real time, directly from the Craigslist 
website.”). 
64  Id. at 969–70. 
65  Sellars, supra note 15, at 410. 
66 Id. at 380. 
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website that signaled revocation of a user’s access, whether done in an 
access-based or code-based manner, could be used as evidence of unlawful 
conduct in violation of the CFAA.67 For example, courts have found CFAA 
violations based on a direct demand to stop accessing the website,68 the 
website imposing an IP address block,69 or even the contents of a website’s 
terms of use.70 They held that these actions served as a valid notice of 
access revocation.71 But the United States’ courts’ refocus on revocation 
seems to sideline technical control issues (e.g., IP-address blocks), an issue 
highlighted in Power Ventures II. 72  This revocation-based theory, 
“[re]opened the door to a wide array of authorization mechanisms that 
previously had been narrowed away.”73  
In 2017—arguably Phase IV’s beginning, but it is too early to 
definitively say—the courts began rejecting this broader revocation-based 
reading.74 The first case to do so was hiQ Labs v. LinkedIn,75 where hiQ 
Labs scraped data from public LinkedIn profiles to offer business 
analytics.76 LinkedIn sent a cease-and-desist letter to the defendant and 
imposed an IP block on it. 77  Despite the facts bearing a striking 
resemblance to 3Taps, the court found the defendant’s scraping was not 
“access without authorization” in violation of the CFAA.78 In reaching its 
conclusion, the court distinguished Power Ventures II, reasoning that the 
data there was not “public” because login credentials were required to 
access Facebook’s content.79 The court also seemed to signal disagreement 
 
67  Id. at 402. 
68  CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS, 2016, 2016 WL 3181826, at *4 
(N.D. Ind. June 8, 2016); Sellars, supra note 15, at 405. 
69  CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-39-TLS, 2017 WL 83337, at *3 (N.D. 
Ind. Jan. 10, 2017); Sellars, supra note 15, at 405 (as to one party who did not receive a direct 
communication, “[r]evocation of website access would have been sufficient to give the Defendants 
constructive notice that they were without authorisation to act as they allegedly did”). 
70  See QVC, Inc. v. Resultly, LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 525 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“[J]ust as a cease-and-
desist letter would put a publisher on notice that its actions were prohibited, VigLink's Terms of 
Service . . . put Resultly on notice that QVC prohibited web-crawling”); DHI Group, Inc. v. Kent, No. 
16-cv-1670, 2017 WL 4837730 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017); Sellars, supra note 15, at 405.  
71  See Sellars, supra note 15, at 405 (“With the focus placed on “revocation,” questions about the 
legal impacts of technical controls like user accounts or IP and MAC address filtering all fell away in 
favor of an analysis which asked whether the website owner used a technical control to signal a 
revocation of access . . . .”). 
72  Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc. (Power Ventures II), 844 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 
2016); Sellars, supra note 15, at 406. 
73  Sellars, supra note 15, at 404. 
74  Id. at 381. 
75  hiQ Labs, Inc. v. Linkedln Corp., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
76  Id. at 1104. 
77  Id. 
78  Sellars, supra note 15, at 408; hiQ Labs, Inc. 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1114–18. 
79  hiQ Labs, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1109 (“[n]one of the data in Facebook or Nosal II was public 
data”) (emphasis in original). 
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with the result in 3Taps after looking at the CFAA’s legislative history.80 
To support its reasoning, the court referenced Professor Orin Kerr’s 
seminal work, Norms of Computer Trespass, which draws an analogy to 
trespass law to read into the scope of “authorization” and sees the website 
as “inherently open.”81 Lastly, the court also considered public policy, 
noting that assigning CFAA liability when someone accesses a website in 
breach of a written instruction would allow website owners to block users 
for improper purposes such as anti-competition.82  
A year after LinkedIn, a group of scholars and journalists who used 
scraping in their research filed suit in Sandvig v. Sessions.83That case 
expressly took the narrow view of the CFAA seen in 3Taps, finding that 
only code-based controls—rather than use restrictions—should be the basis 
of CFAA liability because the public should have a general right to access 
publicly-facing websites.84 In doing so, the court recognized that scraping 
“is merely a technological advance that makes information collection 
easier; it is not meaningfully different from using a tape recorder instead 
of taking written notes.” 85  These cases either do not address the 
“revocation” line of cases or attempt to fit their analysis into them, but in 
a manner that would seemingly make it “far more difficult to stop a scraper 
from accessing a website available to the general public, even if told to stop 
by the website in question.”86 
This narrow view would “perfectly align the CFAA with the 
technical realities of web scraping,” which should not be thought of as 
inherently more invasive or dangerous than a person or web browser.87 
However, there are vital issues that have not been addressed, such as 
 
80  hiQ Labs, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1109 (“The CFAA must be interpreted in its historical context, 
mindful of Congress’ purpose. The CFAA was not intended to police traffic to publicly available 
websites on the Internet . . . .”).  
81  Id. at 1111–13. For a detailed analysis, see Orin Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass 116 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1143, 1153, 1163 (2016) (“[A] person who connects a web server to the Internet agrees to let 
everyone access the computer much like one who sells his wares at a public fair agrees to let everyone 
see what is for sale”). 
82  hiQ Labs Inc., 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1119. On public interests, hiQ argued that “private party 
should not have the unilateral authority to restrict other private parties from accessing information that 
is otherwise available freely to all” and this can raise “serious constitutional questions” for it would allow 
private parties to decide “who gets to participate in the marketplace of ideas located in the ‘modern public 
square’ of the Internet.” Id. LinkedIn rejected this view, contending that screen scraping can raise privacy 
concern and more crucially, “if its users knew that their data was freely available to unrestricted 
collection and analysis by third parties for any purposes, they would be far less likely to make such 
information available online.” Id. 
83  Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2018).  
84  Id. at 13. The court also referred to Professor Kerr’s work, noting that “code-based restrictions, 
which ‘carve[ ] out a virtual private space within the website or service that requires proper authentication 
to gain access,’ remove those protected portions of a site from the public forum.” Id. For a detailed 
analysis of Orin Kerr’s work in this regard, see Kerr, supra note 81. 
85  Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 1 (D.D.C. 2018). 
86  Sellars, supra note 15 at 381. 
87  Id. at 412–13, 415.  
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resolving the tension between the “revocation” cases (in Phase III) and the 
more recent cases (arguably Phase IV) that find a general right to access.88 
Thus, the United States’ courts will need to develop a more coherent 
approach going forward.89  
(b) Reflections. — The CFAA has long been criticized for its 
“disproportionate punishments,” “vague definitions,” and “overbroad” 
terms.90 While the Act was initially aimed at criminal hackers, 91 its failure 
to define several key terms like “access” and “authorization” have 
permitted its application in situations where no hacking actually 
occurred.92 
Critiques of the CFAA can be boiled down to two competing 
narratives.93 First, anyone can access any website. Second, website owners 
could place limitations, caveats, or barriers to access. The hard dilemma 
facing policymakers is when and where to draw the line to keep the 
cyberspace open without overly undercutting the scope of “authorization” 
under the CFAA. There are proposals to address these issues.94 The first 
option is to read the CFAA narrowly and within its unique context—that 
of computer networks and the internet—with contextual meanings, 
therefore, given to critical terms like “exceeds authorized access.”95 Legal 
practitioner Kathleen Riley has argued that courts should create a “judicial 
presumption of authorization” in CFAA cases involving public websites or 
valid login information.96 Only by way of showing that a user “hacked” the 
website or otherwise had no permission to use the login credentials could 
this presumption be overcome.97 Under this narrow reading, circumventing 
measures like IP address blocks would not be considered a CFAA violation. 
Instead, the scope of the CFAA would be properly limited to hacking.98 
This would square with the statute’s original purpose.99 
 
88  Id. at 413. 
89  Id. 
90  Hernacki, supra note 35, at 1554; Macapinlac, supra note 14, at 404, 412; Riley, supra note 35, 
at 271, 299; Jensen, supra note 34, at 84; Jonathan Keim, Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Oct. 2015), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/updating-the-computer-
fraud-and-abuse-act-1 (last visited July 9, 2020); Carrero, supra note 17, at 134. 
91  Riley, supra note 35, at 267, 272. 
92  Riley, supra note 35, at 271. 
93  Kerr, supra note 81, at 1161. 
94  See, e.g., Riley, supra note 35, at 290. 
95  Id. at 245, 291. See also Jensen, supra note 34, at 81; Hernacki, supra note 35, at 1543; Carrero, 
supra note 17, at 170. 
96  Riley, supra note 35, at 245, 294–95. 
97  Id. 
98  See, e.g., Riley, supra note 35, at 294–95 (arguing that “the presumption of authorization to 
access a public website can only be overcome by a showing that a user did not have permission…or that 
user ‘hacked’ the website.”). 
99  Id. at 296; Hernacki, supra note 35, at 1574. 
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A more straightforward option is amending the CFAA to clarify the 
ambiguous terms and add exceptions around data scraping.100 While courts 
have so far been reluctant to limit the CFAA’s scope, adding more specific 
definitions of terms like “authorization” and “access” would assist them in 
doing so.101  An explicit carve-out rule for scraping public information 
would “limit the pool of defendants to true bad actors and allow the 
activities of data aggregators to continue,” “prevent large companies from 
using the courts for anti-competitive purposes,” and “honor the traditions 
of openness upon which the Internet was built.”102 Unfortunately, efforts 
to amend the statute have thus far failed. In 2013, a bill known as “Aaron’s 
Law” was introduced to amend the CFAA to add that a violation of terms 
of service could not be prosecuted under the Act and penalties would be 
made more suited to the crime.103 Despite praise from organizations like 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the bill never passed.104 Many scholars 
are calling for the CFAA’s modernization to “reflect the significant 
technological changes that have occurred since 1986.” 105  Instead, web 
scraping would be more appropriately examined by doctrines that police 
the use of information, as in the case of copyright law.106 Notably, the 
United States Supreme Court may weigh in on this perennial issue in 
LinkedIn, should it grant review. While this case is still pending, the recent 
Open Banking movement that facilitates data sharing may play a role in 
managing these ramifications too. 
2. Trespass to Chattels. — Trespass to chattels offers website 
operators an alternative avenue for relief in the United States.107 Generally, 
this state law claim may be committed by “intentionally . . . using or 
intermeddling with a chattel in possession of another” when “the chattel is 
 
100  Riley, supra note 35, at 291; Hernacki, supra note 35, at 1581; Zamora, supra note 33, at 224–
26. 
101  Riley, supra note 35, at 300–01. 
102  Zamora, supra note 33, at 224–25; Carrero, supra note 17, at 135 (noting that currently, the 
CFAA “crudely lumps together different forms of scraping that have different motivations and 
implications for social values.”). 
103  Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013). 
104  Carrero, supra note 17, at 166; Macapinlac, supra note 14, at 405. Aaron’s Law was introduced 
by members of Congress in response to the prosecution of Aaron Swartz, who scraped the contents of 
the JSTOR academic article database for a research project and was charged with eleven violations of 
the CFAA as a result. Kieren McCarthy, ‘Aaron’s Law’s Back on the Table to Bring Sanity to U.S. 
Hacking Laws, REGISTER (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.theregister.com/2015/04/23/congress_reintrodu
ces_aarons_law/. In 2015, it was reintroduced in both the Senate and House, though these efforts were 
not fruitful either. Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, S. 1030, 114th Cong. (2015); Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, 
H.R. 1918, 114th Cong. (2015). For a recount, see, e.g., Kieren McCarthy, ‘Aaron’s Law’s Back on the 
Table to Bring Sanity to U.S. Hacking Laws, REGISTER (Apr. 23, 2015), 
https://www.theregister.com/2015/04/23/congress_reintroduces_aarons_law/; see also Indictment, 
United States v. Swartz, No. 1:11-cr-10260 (D. Mass. July 14, 2011). 
105  Macapinlac, supra note 14, at 422; Riley, supra note 35, at 300–01. 
106  Sellars, supra note 15, at 388; Riley, supra note 35, at 305. 
107  Zamora, supra note 33, at 220. 
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impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or… the possessor is 
deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time.”108  
It was first applied to the digital context in the 1990s 109  and 
subsequently extended to a scraping case in eBay v. Bidder’s Edge.110 This 
case laid out the legal standard for trespass to chattels claims in the web 
scraping context: the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the defendant 
intentionally and without authorization interfered with the plaintiff’s 
possessory interest in the computer system, and (2) that the defendant’s 
unauthorized use damaged the plaintiff.111 In its application to scraping 
cases, the tort seems to undergo at least two developmental stages. While 
courts were initially willing to apply the doctrine even where there was no 
physical damage to the digital property,112 physical damage has recently 
become a requirement for trespass to chattels claims.113  
The first stage began with Bidder’s Edge, where eBay successfully 
sued Bidder’s Edge to stop it from scraping its website.114 eBay sued under 
a trespass to chattels claim, arguing that Bidder’s Edge intermeddled with 
eBay’s servers without authorization, resulting in them “free-riding” on the 
time, effort, and money that eBay had invested to create its system.115 
While the increased traffic on eBay’s server caused by Bidder’s Edge 
scraping alone was insignificant (i.e., comprising less than 2% of the total 
capacity),116 the court found potential future harm in the possibility that 
other data aggregators would scrape the website and collectively burden 
servers.117 Similarly, the court in Southwest Airlines v. Farechase found 
scraping flight information from the airline’s website constituted a trespass 
to chattels.118 While Southwest could not prove it had endured physical 
harm or deprivation, the scraper’s use was unauthorized and deceived 
Southwest customers who mistakenly believed they had contracted with 
 
108  Riley, supra note 35, at 265 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217(b), 218(b)–(c) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1965); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 438 n.58 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
109  Din, supra note 12, at 432 (noting that in the 1990s, trespass to chattels was applied to cases 
involving devices that overused phone and email networks, diminishing their functionality). 
110  eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065, 1069–72 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Riley, 
supra note 35, at 265 (arguing that trespass to chattels is “commonly argued in data scraping cases, under 
the theory that a defendant’s scraping interfered with a plaintiff’s use of its website and servers by 
consuming intangible resources such as network and server capacity. These harms are often 
acknowledged to be minimal.”). 
111  Zamora, supra note 33, at 220. 
112  See, e.g., Thrifty-Tel, Inc v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 473 (holding that “the electronic signals 
generated by the Bezenek boys' activities were sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of 
action.”). 
113  Din, supra note 12, at 433. 
114  Id. at 435. 
115  eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065, 1070-71 (N.D. Cal. 2000).  
116  Id. at 1064. 
117  Id. at 1071-72; Hirschey, supra note 4, at 919. 
118  Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 435, 442 (N.D. Tex. 2004). 
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Southwest.119 As a result, the court found Farechase’s scraping activity 
wrongfully interfered with Southwest’s use and possession of its 
website.120 In both cases, the websites subject to scraping were publicly 
accessible, but the scraping still constituted a trespass as it was sufficiently 
outside the scope of the sites’ permitted uses.121 
In 2003, courts began requiring that scrapers physically interfere 
with the use or operation of a computer before assigning liability.122 One 
court reasoned that gathering data from a public website, without more, is 
insufficient to fulfill a trespass action’s harm requirement.123 That the same 
year, the Supreme Court of California employed similar reasoning in Intel 
v Hamidi.124 Although Hamidi was not a scraper case,125 the court held that 
to invoke a trespass to chattel claim successfully, the plaintiff would need 
to prove that “a legally protected interest was damaged,”126 making a minor 
interference with server usage was insufficient to make out actionable 
harm.127 As these cases indicate, web scraping has become less actionable 
under a trespass to chattels theory.128  
Nonetheless, trespass to chattel is still a viable legal option when a 
scraper causes actual harm.129 Courts have found actual harm to include 
“overburdened networks, lost space, threats to business reputation and 
goodwill with customers, threats of similar future conduct, intermeddling 
with servers without authorization, wrongful interference with use or 
possession, and free-riding on data hosts’ investments.”130 One commenter 
suggested that while the Hamidi and Ticketmaster decisions were less 
flexible in their harm determinations, 131  they “involved different 
 
119  Id. at 422; Din, supra note 12, at 436. 
120  Southwest Airlines Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d at 442; Din, supra note 12, at 436.  
121  eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070; Southwest Airlines Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d at 442.  
122  Din, supra note 12, at 436. 
123  Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., No. 2:99-cv-07654-HLH-VBK, 2003 WL 21406289, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003). The court rejected the argument that “mere use of a spider to enter a 
publicly available web site to gather information, without more, is sufficient to fulfill the harm 
requirement.” Id. Tickets.Com employed a web crawler to extract factual information (event, date, time, 
ticket pricing, URL) from the public webpages of Ticketmaster, and then organized the information in 
their own format to display it on its own page. Id. at 2. 
124  See generally Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (holding that a former Intel 
employee sending disruptive emails to current employees did not circumvent any techincal security 
measures or physically damage the computer systems).  
125  Id.  
126  Intel, 71 P.3d at 300. 
127  “However, the court left open the possibility that a greater interference, perhaps crashing a 
website's server, may still be an actionable harm under trespass to chattel.” Hirschey, supra note 4, at 915. 
128  Zamora, supra note 33, at 223. 
129  Register.com, 356 F. 3d at 444 (affirming that trespass to chattel is still successful against 
harmful scrapers). 
130  Din, supra note 12, at 438. 
131  Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003); Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *3. In 
Ticketmaster, the scraper only compiled public pricing data (without a significant load on the server) 
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considerations than most harmful scraping cases” and do not significantly 
impact the potential trespass to chattels claim, generally.132 Consequently, 
trespass to chattels continues to provide an alternative to situations where 
CFAA liability cannot be established, especially in cases involving less 
pervasive scraping that still damages the data host. 
There are criticisms against applying trespass to chattels to screen 
scraping. For instance, Professor Riley argues that claims under this theory 
involve “fundamental misunderstandings of the subject matter of online 
property rights.”133 Put differently, the tort’s application in this manner 
implies the existence of real property in cyberspace: a “deeply flawed” 
analogy considering that computers and servers are chattels, rather than 
real property. For this reason and others, some commentators like Riley 
have begun considering copyright as a more promising tool for addressing 
web scraping cases.134 
3. Compilation Copyright Infringement. — Data hosts could bring 
copyright claims against scrapers if the scraped content involved meets the 
copyright infringement claim’s requirements. Web scraping by its nature 
involves copying, which is a component of copyright infringement.135 
Moreover, copyright claims are appealing due to their availability of 
substantial damages and a period of copyright protection.136 For example, 
in Craigslist v. 3Taps, the court held that Craigslist successfully acquired 
an exclusive license to the copyright in users’ advertisements for a short 
period.137 
Yet, it can be challenging, as a matter of practice, to establish a 
copyright claim under the United States law because a database will only 
benefit from copyright protection if it is “sufficiently creative.” 138  A 
 
and provided a hyperlink that transferred users directly to the Ticketmaster website for purchase. See 
Din, supra note 12, at 438. 
132  Din, supra note 12, at 438. 
133  Riley, supra note 35, at 286. 
134  Id. at 305. 
135  Zamora, supra note 33, at 215. 
136  Hirschey, supra note 4, at 910–11. 
137  Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 974–76 (N.D. Cal. 2013). This finding has 
been criticized by commentators as anti-competitive. Eric Goldman, for instance, remarked that: “It’s a 
terrible and anti-competitive practice for a classified advertising website to claim exclusive copyright 
interests in its advertisers’ ad copy. Read literally, advertisers violate Craigslist’s copyright interests by 
displaying their ad copy at any other online publication. Want to simultaneously post a photo of an item 
for sale on eBay and Craigslist? Craigslist’s position is that you would infringe its copyright by doing 
so.” Eric Goldman, Craigslist’s Anti-Consumer Lawsuit Threatens to Break Internet Law, FORBES (May 
23, 2013, 11:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/05/23/craigslists-anti-consumer-
lawsuit-threatens-to-break-internet-law/?sh=283cba573e39. 
138  Hirschey, supra note 4, at 906–07; Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 
499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1991) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 
539, 556 (1985) (“The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘[n]o author may copyright his 
ideas or the facts he narrates’”). See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE PRACTICES § 101, § 308.2 (3rd ed. 2017) (“If the Office determines that a work possesses sufficient 
creativity, it will register the claim and issue a certificate of registration.”). 
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plaintiff must also be able to assert ownership and negate a fair use defense, 
for which courts weigh several factors: (1) the purpose and character of the 
use, (2) the nature of the protected work, (3) the amount of the work used, 
and (4) the market value of the use.139 Many commercial data scrapers have 
successfully asserted a fair use defense in response to copyright claims.140 
Unlike the European Union or United Kingdom, there is no direct legal 
protection for databases.141  Overall, copyright claims for data scraping 
have not had particular success in the United States.142 
4. Contract and Data Privacy Claims. — Data hosts also argue that 
scraping is a breach of contract when it has been explicitly prohibited in 
the websites’ terms of use. 143  Facebook, 144  LinkedIn, 145  eBay, 146 
Twitter,147 Craigslist,148 TripAdvisor,149 and IMDB150 have all prohibited 
scraping in their terms of use.151 For a breach of contract argument to 
succeed, the website user must enter an explicit agreement with the data 
host to comply with these policies.152 This was the case in Register.com v. 
 
139  Zamora, supra note 33, at 215–16. 
140  Id., at 216; see, e.g., Ticketmaster, 2003 WL 21406289, at *5 (holding that the scraping of the 
plaintiff’s ticket purchasing platform to acquire event information was protected from a copyright claim 
by the fair use defense. Even though the use was for a commercial purpose and only slightly 
transformative, only the plaintiff’s aggregated non-copyrightable information was put on display, and 
the defendant’s final product did not damage the market value of the plaintiff’s product). 
141  Hirschey, supra note 4, at 906–07. 
142  Riley, supra note 35, at 264, 276; Zamora, supra note 33, at 220. 
143  Krotov & Silva, supra note 33, at 3. 
144  Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (“You 
may not access or collect data from our Products using automated means (without our prior permission) 
or attempt to access data you do not have permission to access.”).  
145  User Agreement, LINKEDIN (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement 
(“You agree that you will not . . . develop, support or use software, devices, scripts, robots or any other 
means or processes (including crawlers, browser plugins and add-ons or any other technology) to 
scrape the Services or otherwise copy profiles and other data from the Services . . . .”).  
146  User Agreement, EBAY (June 18, 2020) https://www.ebay.com.au/help/policies/member-
behaviour-policies/user-agreement?id=4259 (“You agree that you will not use any robot, spider, 
scraper or other automated means to access the eBay services for any purpose without our express 
written permission.”). 
147  Terms of Service, TWITTER (June 18, 2020) https://twitter.com/en/tos (“[S]craping the 
Services without the prior consent of Twitter is expressly prohibited  . . . .”).  
148  Terms of Use, CRAIGSLIST (Dec. 29, 2017) https://www.craigslist.org/about/terms.of.use/en 
(“You agree not to copy/collect CL content via robots, spiders, scripts, scrapers, crawlers, or any 
automated or manual equivalent (e.g., by hand).”).  
149  TripAdvisor Terms, Conditions and Notices, TRIPADVISOR (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://tripadvisor.mediaroom.com/us-terms-of-use (“[Y]ou agree not to . . . access, monitor . . . [or] 
copy . . . any Content of the Services . . . using any robot, spider, scraper or other automated means or 
any manual process for any purpose . . . without our express written permission . . . .”).  
150  Conditions of Use, IMDB (Dec. 3, 2020) https://www.imdb.com/conditions (“You may not 
use data mining, robots, screen scraping, or similar data gathering and extraction tools on this site, 
except with our express written consent as noted below.”).  
151  Riley, supra note 35, at 257–78. 
152  For example, by clicking a checkbox. Krotov & Silva, supra note 33, at 3. 
44 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 30 NO. 1 
Verio, where notice of Register’s terms of use bound Verio to the 
agreement, resulting in Register’s successful contract breach claim.153 
Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States does not have 
comprehensive data privacy legislation at the federal level.154 While some 
privacy-related rights are mandated in state statutes, most do not broadly 
regulate the collection and use of personal data. 155  However, privacy-
related rights are changing significantly in some states: notably, the recent 
California Consumer Privacy Act. It has implemented restrictions that 
require companies collecting PII to disclose the “categories of personal 
information to be collected and the purposes for which the categories of 
personal information shall be used.” 156  Therefore, scraping may be 
implicated by this new statute, which came into effect in January 2020.157 
These changes may further expose data scraping to additional legal actions 
in the United States’ courts. 
B. United Kingdom Approach 
Across the Atlantic, laws surrounding web scraping are relatively 
unclear and untested. 158  Nonetheless, while scraping is not addressed 
explicitly in most legislation, website owners have attempted to shoe-horn 
established causes of action into this new area. 159  Depending on the 
particular circumstances, web scraping could infringe IPRs,160 breach a 
contract, 161  violate the Computer Misuse Act, 162  or contravene data 
protection legislation.163 In contrast to the United States, the trespass to 
chattels claim has never been applied to electronic interferences and has 
 
153  Register.com, 356 F.3d at 403 (“[The defendant] was offered access to information subject to 
terms of which [it was] well aware. [Its] choice was either to accept the offer of contract, taking the 
information subject to the terms of the offer, or, if the terms were not acceptable, to decline to take the 
benefits.”); Zamora, supra note 33, at 224. 
154  See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 930 (2009) 
(discussing in detail the different paths taken by the European Union and United States in terms of data 
protection and supporting the argument that “[a]n omnibus federal privacy law would be a dubious 
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scarcely been used in any other context. 164  Furthermore, the inherent 
differences between the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s law of 
trespass may prevent such a development in the future. Trespass to chattels 
is only actionable in the United States where there has been some “damage,” 
while trespass to chattels in the United Kingdom may be actionable per 
se—that is, even in the absence of damage. 165  Without this damage 
requirement to limit the action’s scope, “cyber-trespass” in the United 
Kingdom would be applicable to too many digital situations to be practical 
or useful.166  As a result, data hosts can rely on other claims like IPR 
infringement, contract claims, and data privacy actions.167  
1. IPRs: Copyright and Database Right Infringement. — The most 
relevant IPRs in this context are copyright and database rights. Scraping 
may amount to copyright infringement if (1) significant portions of text are 
scraped, and (2) the text is from a creative source.168 For example, in Public 
Relations Consultants Association v. NLA169 the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court found that scraping headlines from a news website and subsequently 
hyperlinking them to the original articles amounted to copyright 
infringement.170  The Court reasoned that news headlines did require a 
certain degree of creative input that make them susceptible to copyright 
suites.171 
Given these possible hurdles associated with copyright infringement 
claims, database rights are more likely to protect against data scraping in 
practice. 172  This sui generis right arises from the European Database 
Directive and has been enacted in the United Kingdom through the 
Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 (CRDR). 173  No 
“creative” aspect is needed, as database rights automatically subsists if 
there has been “substantial investment in obtaining, verifying, or 
presenting the contents” of the database—that is, in searching for material 
to include in the database, checking such material, and keeping it updated 
 
164  Id. at 15; Darren Read, Should the English Legal System Adopt the US Law of Cyber-trespass? 
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over time.174 Databases can include a collection of profiles on a social 
website, an individual’s blog, and any other collection with systematically-
arranged items that are individually accessible.175 The right is infringed 
when a person extracts or re-utilizes “all or a substantial part” of a 
database’s contents.176 Database rights, if they exists in a database, will 
therefore preclude many forms of unauthorized data scraping.177 While a 
fair-dealing provision exists to negate liability, it only applies if the scraper 
is a lawful database user, who provides attribution or extracts data for a 
research-related non-commercial purpose.178 Database rights are thus one 
of the most common claims brought by data hosts against scrapers.179 
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s 
decisions in British Horseracing Board v. William Hill180 and Football 
Dataco v. Yahoo! 181  set a “very high threshold” for the “substantial 
investment” requirement.182 Thus, even the CRDR is not a sure protection 
for data hosts. 
2. Contractual Restrictions in the Website’s Terms of Use. — 
Alternatively, scraping could be prohibited with contractual restrictions.183 
If the user agrees to a website’s terms of use that include an express 
limitation on data scraping, but the user then scrapes information, the 
website owner may be able to make a claim against the user for breach of 
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was completed. Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, SI 1997/3032, art. 17, ¶ 1. 
175  “Database” is defined as “a collection of independent works, data or other materials which— 
(a) are arranged in a systematic or methodical way, and (b) are individually accessible by electronic or 
other means.” Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, SI 1997/3032, art. 6, ¶ 1. 
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4 QUEEN MARY INTELL. PROP. REV. 3, 11 (2014). Also, Maarten and Van Eeke argued that “Evaluating 
whether a part is indeed substantial can be performed quantitatively (in relation to the total size of the 
database) and/or qualitatively (i.e., by measuring the scale of the human, technical or financial 
investment). Hence, even when only a small part of the entire database is extracted, this may represent a 
qualitatively substantial part e for example when the affected part constitutes the core part of the database 
or the part containing the most useful information.” See Truyens & Van Eeke, supra note 174, at 161. 
177  James, supra note 158, at 13; Guadamuz & Cabell, supra note 172, at 12. 
178  Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997, SI 1997/3032, art. 20; Truyens & Van 
Eeke, supra note 174, at 161. 
179  James, supra note 158, at 13. 
180  C-203/02, British Horseracing Board Ltd. v. William Hill Organization Ltd. 2004 E.C.R. I-
10415 (finding that to extend protection to a database, parties must show there has been “qualitatively 
and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the 
contents . . . .”). 
181  C-604/10, Football Dataco Ltd. v. Yahoo! UK Ltd., 2012 E.C.R. 0000 (finding it is irrelevant 
to consider the intellectual effort and skill that went into creating the original data; the key tenant for 
protection is whether there is originality expressed in selecting or arranging the data). 
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after the British Horseracing Board decision, website owners will have to demonstrate a substantial 
investment in presenting and displaying the date, which is a high threshold). 
183  Rezai, supra note 160. 
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contract.184 In establishing this, the website owner must show that its terms 
of use are enforceable and have been breached.185 However, they may 
struggle to do so because: (1) terms and conditions are often just optional 
links rather than terms expressly agreed to, and (2) automated scraping bots 
can simply bypass the terms and conditions, rather than “reading” and 
understanding them as a human would.186 Where terms and conditions do 
not have to be accepted by scrapers, or else are not sufficiently brought to 
one’s attention, it is difficult to establish that a contract has been formed.187 
One possible fix might be requiring each user to agree expressly with the 
terms and conditions before using the site. Yet, this solution could be 
commercially impractical and damage the user experience.188 While there 
is no clear precedent on whether website terms form binding contracts in 
the United Kingdom, a 2015 case decided in the CJEU held that screen 
scraping could be effectively prohibited in a website’s terms and 
conditions.189  Overall, contract claims could prohibit scraping where a 
website owner could not otherwise rely on IPRs to protect their data.190  
3. Contravention of the Computer Misuse Act. — The Computer 
Misuse Act of 1990 is analogous to the United States’ CFAA in targeting 
hacking. It provides that a person is guilty of a criminal offense if they 
knowingly cause “a computer to perform any function with intent to secure 
access to any program or data held in any computer or to enable any such 
access to be secured” when such access is unauthorized.191 But as of this 
writing, the courts have not determined whether data scraping constitutes 
a breach of this Act.192  
4. Protection of Personal Data Under the GDPR/United Kingdom 
Data Protection Act of 2018. — If the information being collected includes 
 
184  Id.; Nikova, supra note 161. 
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database is not subject to Directive 96/9’s application, the terms and conditions may function as a 
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 Computer Misuse Act 1990, c. 18, § 1 (UK), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/se
ction/1; James, supra note 158, at 14. 
192  James, supra note 158, at 14; Sisto & Swaniker, supra note 155. According to practitioner Clare 
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“personal data,” 193  then the collector must comply with the European 
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)—as implemented 
via the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018).194 Under 
this legislation, screen scraping of personal data is only lawful when done 
under one of six legal bases.195 One of these basis is the consent of the data 
subject, which must be freely given, related to a specific purpose, informed, 
and unambiguous.196 Scrapers will experience difficultly demonstrating 
that they have obtained an individual’s consent. Arguably, scrapers may 
instead attempt to rely on the “legitimate interests” basis for processing, 
which is assessed concerning purpose, necessity, and balance between 
interests.197 Alex Sisto and Herbert Swaniker remarked that this basis “is 
not a panacea”—rather, it entails considering the interests of the business 
against those of the individual, taking into account the reasonable 
expectations of the latter. 198  The purpose of scraping is, therefore, 
important in determining its legality under the GDPR/DPA 2018.199 For 
instance, if a business scrapes data to compile a marketing list that is sold 
to third parties, it is unlikely that the individuals on that marketing list 
reasonably expected their personal data to be used in such a way. 
Furthermore, even if a valid basis for processing is found, 
subsequent processing must be limited to that which is fair, proportionate, 
and necessary.200 This principle needs careful consideration by businesses 
intending to scrape websites, because their software usually gathers data in 
bulk.201 Therefore, in the context of personal data, it may be “very hard to 
prove that invisible scraping is fair and transparent,” as the GDPR/DPA 
2018 is seeking to protect people from “invisible processing.”202 
C. The Australian Approach 
Australia currently has no laws that expressly prohibit or address 
screen scraping. 203  Neither has the practice been addressed to any 
significant degree by the courts, leading one commentator to remark that 
 
193  European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (defining 
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201  Sisto & Swaniker, supra note 155. 
202  Sisto & Swaniker, supra note 155. 
203  Sutton et al., supra note 31. Yet, there is one small exception: The Spam Act 2003 prohibits the 
harvesting/scraping of email addresses from websites (but not any other type of scraping). Spam Act 
2003 (Cth) pt 3 (Austl.). 
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Australia “has not specifically considered web scraping in either a judicial 
or legislative context.”204 Despite this, several existing frameworks could 
be utilized to bring a claim against screen scraping.205 In the absence of 
database rights—as in the United Kingdom—and any common law 
precedent on the “hacking” statutory provisions—as in the United States—
contract claims’ have been called the “first line of defense” against screen 
scraping in Australia. 206  In contrast to the United States, it is unclear 
whether trespass to chattels will be expanded to the digital domain by 
Australian courts.207 Like the United Kingdom, it does not seem necessary 
to show damage for this tort to succeed.208 Showing damage would lead to 
an overly-broad law if extended to cyberspace.209 Mary Wong,210 notes that 
while trespass to chattels has “experienced something of a renaissance in 
the US,” there has been little judicial activities on this front in other 
common law countries.211 We now consider the potential claims in turn. 
1. Contractual Restrictions in the Website’s Terms of Use. — Where 
a website’s terms of use specifically prohibit screen scraping, the website 
owner could bring a claim against scrapers for breach of contract. 212 
However, this presents the same difficulties discussed above in the United 
Kingdom context: in addition to expressly prohibiting screen scraping, the 
terms of use must be considered an enforceable agreement between the 
website owner and the user.213 Knowledge and acceptance of the contract 
terms are a clear pre-condition to the use of the website.214 By contrast, 
“browse-wrap” agreements, where the terms of use are available for 
viewing somewhere on the site, and no active acceptance is required, are 
much less clear-cut in terms of enforceability.215 It might be that only click-
wrap will allow a claim against a screen scraper for breach of contract.216 
In short, Australian courts have yet to consider the divergence of 
application in detail.217  
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2. Copyright Infringement. — Alternatively, copyright can exist in 
website content where there is an “original literary work” that satisfies the 
requirements of section 32(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).218 If this is 
the case, substantially copying data from the website without the authority 
of its owner may infringe section 3 of the Act. In Nominet UK v Diverse 
Internet Pty Ltd, the respondents used data mining techniques to extract 
and collate the details of registrants listed on the applicant’s databases.219 
The Federal Court found that copyright existed in the databases and that 
this had been infringed by data mining, with the applicant therefore entitled 
to declaratory and injunctive relief.220  
Whether computer-generated work can be protected by copyright 
law has been controversial in Australian jurisprudence. The Copyright Act 
lacks specific provisions that address the use of digital technologies.221 
This was directly at issue in Telstra Corp Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty 
Ltd,222 which dealt with the subsistence of copyright in the White and 
Yellow Pages telephone directories published by Telstra’s subsidiary. At 
first instance and on appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, it was 
held that the directories were not protected by copyright because they were 
computer-generated works lacking the requisite human authorship. 223 
After the input of data, it was the Genesis Computer System (GCS) that 
checked the information for accuracy and applied the rules relating to fonts, 
color schemes, spacing of words and entries, etc. to generate the form of 
the directories.224 The court thus concluded that any protectable expression 
originated from GCS program rather than from any human authors.225 The 
court was not persuaded that human supervision of the computer system—
in terms of selecting, customizing, and maintaining the program—was as 
authorial. 226  One judge considered whether human supervision of the 
automated system could be protected, while another analogized the 
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program to “plane with its autopilot engaged… flying itself.”227 The court 
then held that controlling the software does not necessarily equate to 
controlling the form, and operating the software is insufficient absent some 
independent intellectual effort directed to the shape of that material 
form.228  Authorship will be “denuded” even if the computer-generated 
content would have, but for the computer generation, received copyright 
protection. 229  This “strict and probably undesirable divide” between 
human-authored and computer-generated works has received considerable 
criticism, 230  with academics claiming that it is “at odds with long-
established precedent,”231 “runs counter to the principle of technology,”232 
and “imposes an unnecessary technological restriction on the copyright 
system.” 233  Jani McCutcheon, 234  for instance, argues that there is no 
convincing reason for denying copyright protection to material based 
solely on its computer generation, given that such material has the same 
potential to confer the social benefits rewarded by copyright as any other 
material, and that many computer-generated works are simply too complex 
for human creation.235 She also notes many common law countries have 
introduced provisions protecting a computer-generated work, including the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand.236 Authorship may be afforded to the 
humans responsible for selecting the particular software over other 
alternatives, which gives effect to a particular desired form and is similar 
to the skill and effort of selecting extracts for a compilation. 237  This 
recognizes the practical reality that complex productions do not just create 
or arrange their material form,238 is consistent with the copyright policy,239 
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and aligns with the realities of how materials are now created in the digital 
environment.240  
An issue with relying upon Australian copyright law is that any 
breach will thus turn on the type of information being scraped, rather than 
the actual scraping itself.241 Further, in most cases the legal action is only 
taken once the scraped data resurfaces, rendering the mechanism 
reactionary in nature.242 Conversely, relying on contractual provisions in 
the terms of use may offer “a more proactive means” of dealing with screen 
scraping.243  
3. Contravention of Cybercrime Act and Related State Legislation. 
— Some types of data are protected under the federal Cybercrime Act 2001 
and similarly worded legislation that sets forth several computer-related 
offences.244 One such offense is intentionally “caus[ing] any unauthorised 
access to… restricted data” with the knowledge that such access is 
unauthorized. 245  “Restricted data” means data protected by an access 
control system, like a password.246 As such, the majority of screen scraping 
will not breach these provisions, as the data being scraped is not “restricted 
data”–it is data on publicly available websites not protected by security or 
access control systems.247 Unlike the CFAA in the United States, only 
criminal liability exists under these cybersecurity statutes. One question 
remaining is whether measures like IP-blocking—illustrated in the United 
States case eBay v Bidder’s Edge—constitute an “access control system,” 
so website content would be considered “restricted data” in the Australian 
context. It remains to be seen how this argument would play out in 
Australian courts. 
4. Protection of “Sensitive Data” Under the Privacy Act. — If web 
scraping includes the collection of “sensitive information” about an 
individual such as biometric information, political opinions, or religious 
beliefs, then Australian Privacy Principle 3 under the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth) applies.248 This provision requires the organization to gather such 
information that obtains the relevant individual’s consent.249 It would be 
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infeasible for a scraper to obtain explicit consent from each relevant 
individual where they are collecting information in bulk.250 However, they 
could potentially contend that due to the gathered information’s public 
nature, consent was implicit.251  It remains to be seen if this would be 
upheld in court, given the robust protections afforded under the Privacy 
Act.252  
Some practitioners like Lesley Sutton253 have illustrated this with 
the example of Clearview AI, a surveillance start-up scraping three billion 
images of individuals from third party websites, including Facebook, 
Google, and LinkedIn, and then using these images to train its surveillance 
tool. 254  The biometric data from the images fall within the ambit of 
“sensitive information” under the Privacy Act 1988, meaning that the 
organization shall obtain either explicit or inferred consent from each 
photographed individual. 255  While explicit consent was not given, 
Clearview AI could argue that there was inferred consent, given the public 
nature of the information obtained.256 
II. SCRAPING NO MORE? ASSESSING THE ROLE OF OPEN BANKING 
INITIATIVES 
In each of the jurisdictions examined, there are, at least in theory, 
multiple avenues for data hosts to seek relief against scrapers. Some legal 
options are more difficult to pursue than others, depending on the country. 
Other remedies have received inconsistent interpretations between the 
common law jurisdictions, like the term “authorization.” 257  Such a 
divergence can be moderated with the emergence of the “Open Banking” 
movement.  
Starting from the Directive 2015/2366 on Payment Services in the 
Internal Market—known as PSD II in the European Union—countries 
across the world have or are contemplating a new framework to govern 
data sharing among different players in the financial market. These Open 
Banking schemes require or encourage—depending upon different models 
taken by each jurisdiction—banks to share consumer-permissioned 
banking data with third parties securely, in a form, typically through a 
standardized method of communication that enables data flow between 
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systems and facilitates its use called application programming interface 
(API).258 Given that Open Banking can facilitate data sharing, countries 
could arguably reduce the demand for screen scraping. This will turn on 
the degree of “openness” of the Open Banking regime adopted in each 
jurisdiction.  
Each of the three jurisdictions examined herein sits at different 
points of the spectrum. Although the United States has a relatively large 
body of disputes on screen scraping in general, it lags behind its common 
law counterparts and “has a lot of catching up to do” in the context of data-
sharing in the financial market, with no legislation and little guidance on 
the matter.259 On the other end of the spectrum lies the United Kingdom 
model—which is based on the European Union PSDII and mandates the 
use of APIs for the largest banks and placed restrictions on screen scraping 
by third parties with few exceptions. 260  Somewhere in the middle is 
Australia’s “Consumer Data Right” (CDR), under which banks will be 
required to provide access to customer data via an API—though unlike the 
European/United Kingdom model, there is currently no restriction on 
screen scraping. 261  To have a deeper understanding of Open Banking 
initiatives’ implications for screen scraping, we now examine these 
regimes in detail. 
A. The United States Approach 
The United States is not alone in its “market-driven” approach to an 
Open Banking regime. Singapore, Hong Kong, and New Zealand also 
leave the adoption of APIs up to banks themselves. However, the United 
States authorities have so far minimally involved themselves in initiatives 
to support API development or facilitate a move away from screen scraping 
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overview of different regulatory models, see generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
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https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d486.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2020). 
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https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/us-way-behind-the-curve-on-open-banking. 
260  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 Supplementing 
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in the financial market.262 Commentators have noted that the United States 
is among the “least likely” of global governments to enact Open Banking 
regulation, particularly given its more complex regulatory system.263 The 
United States has at least eight financial services regulatory bodies, some 
of which would have to weigh in on such an initiative, compared to just 
two in the United Kingdom and one in Australia.264 Others remarked that 
due to a more competitive retail banking market, the United States lacks 
one of the significant incentives for Open Banking seen in Europe and 
Australia.265 A report released by the United States Treasury in 2018 seems 
to confirm the view that no federal policy will recommend that APIs be 
promoted and screen scraping discouraged in “a solution developed by the 
private sector.”266 
The United States’ authorities recognize the need to move away 
from screen-scraping to more secure access methods. The Treasury’s 
report stated that screen scraping “increases cybersecurity and fraud risks,” 
provides a Fintech application with “significantly more data than needed,” 
and leads to liability issues whereby a bank may be liable for a loss even 
where screen scraping was used without the bank’s knowledge.267 It also 
notes that “a significant amount of data is still obtained through screen-
scraping.”268 While prescriptive requirements have not been issued, several 
regulatory bodies and industry initiatives have sought to provide guidance 
and standardization for API adoption. 269  Among them, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has issued guidelines for the access 
and use of consumer data, consisting of more high-level principles, such as 
means by which consent should be obtained, rather than the exhaustive 
detail of the PSD II.270 Industry groups have created frameworks to create 
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common standards for the use of APIs in the sector.271 Instead of regulatory 
pressure, it seems that widespread API use (and the correlative decrease in 
screen scraping) will be subject to market players voluntarily adopting such 
standards.272  
Numerous United States’ banks are moving away from screen 
scraping by developing API-based offerings, in contractual partnerships 
with third parties, to enhance digital services and gain competitive 
advantage.273  Large financial institutions like JP Morgan Chase, Wells 
Fargo, and Bank of America actively promote API based offerings.274 
However, absent regulatory-driven API standards, screen scraping remains 
prevalent as a way to offer Fintech services without having to enter 
contractual agreements.275 For banks, the significant capital investment 
required to create and maintain an API may mean that their use is confined 
to larger banks. 276  This may be partially alleviated by the increasing 
penetration of technology firms that provide an API on behalf of a bank, 
thereby facilitating Open Banking and decreasing the use of screen 
scraping in the United States’ “hands-off” approach.277 
B. The United Kingdom Approach 
Upon implementing PSD II in 2018, the United Kingdom became 
the first nation to offer a government-led Open Banking program. 278 
Generally, the PSD II requires that banks provide access to a customer’s 
data for authorized third parties, provided that the customer’s explicit 
consent is obtained.279 The third-party may then use this access simply to 
compile account information, or else may initiate a payment from the 
customer’s account.280 This is intended to benefit consumers by increasing 
competition, improving security, and facilitating Fintech development.281 
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The PSD II also requires banks and third-party providers (TPPs) to 
implement various data security controls.282  
While the PSD II seeks to make screen scraping redundant as more 
firms begin to use open APIs for data-sharing, the European Union’s 
Directive itself does not expressly prohibit it.283 Instead, methods of access 
are regulated in the associated Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS).284 
Banks are required under the RTS to ensure access and prepare an interface 
for third party providers—either by creating a dedicated API or by 
modifying their existing interface to enable TPPs to identify themselves (as 
required under the PSD II).285 Modifying an existing interface can be seen 
as screen scraping in a “new, modified form” and has sometimes been 
referred to as “screen scraping plus.”286 Since September 2019, when the 
RTS went into effect, TPPs’ access to accounts must take an authorized 
form.287  
If a bank creates an API for data access, screen scraping by TPPs is 
usually permitted only where this dedicated interface is unavailable or else 
not performing to the required standard. 288  This “fallback provision” 
resulted from the controversy about the role of screen scraping. The Euro 
Banking Association (EBA)’s original draft prohibited the practice, 
reasoning that TPPs would violate the obligation to identify themselves 
and would gain access to information over what was necessary to provide 
their service. 289  After stakeholders lobbied against this total ban, the 
European Commission introduced the fallback provision into a later draft 
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of the RTS.290 The EBA objected to its inclusion, arguing that banks would 
be forced to maintain both an API and an interface allowing “screen 
scraping plus,” increasing costs for new providers.291  These objections 
were tacitly acknowledged by the inclusion of an exemption clause.292 
Where a bank has implemented a compliant, stress-tested, and widely-used 
API, it may be exempted by authorities such that it is not required to allow 
screen scraping as a fallback option.293 When accessing the data held by 
these banks, TPPs are therefore not permitted to use screen scraping under 
any circumstances.294  
More recently, the United Kingdom launched the “Smart Data” 
initiative, which seeks to “give consumers in regulated markets the ability 
to safely, securely and instantly transfer their data” to third parties to 
facilitate cross-sector innovations. 295  Although it remains to be seen 
whether the Smart Data initiative will introduce similar bans on screen 
scraping,296 the fact that it enables free data flows across entities would 
certainly help reduce the need of such techniques, thus reducing 
controversy. 
In short, TPPs may legitimately employ “screen scraping plus,” 
which identifies the TPP and therefore complies with PSD II requirements 
where a bank modifies their existing interface for this purpose rather than 
creating an API.297 Where the bank instead creates an API for data access, 
screen scraping can only be conducted in narrow circumstances, 
specifically, where the API is not performing to the required standard.298 
The legality of screen scraping is even further restricted where a bank has 
implemented a compliant, stress-tested, and widely-used API. In such 
cases, an exemption to the fallback provision can be provided by the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), ensuring that accessing bank-held 
data via screen scraping will always be prohibited.299 
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C. Australian Approach 
While the European Union and United Kingdom pioneered the 
prescriptive approach, Australia has since adopted its own comprehensive 
Open Banking regime as part of the broader Consumer Data Right 
(CDR).300 It requires that the largest banks provide “accredited recipients” 
with access to customer data (upon that customer’s request) by July 
2020. 301  This requirement will eventually extend to all banks and 
eventually apply to other sectors of the economy.302 The CDR implements 
similar security measures to those in the European Union/United Kingdom 
framework and creates its privacy protection mechanism.303  
Yet, despite the CDR’s similarity with its European Union/United 
Kingdom counterpart, screen scraping’s legality is less evident in Australia, 
where legislation remains silent on the issue. Rather than prohibiting or 
endorsing the practice, a government review recommended that Open 
Banking should aim to make it redundant by facilitating more efficient data 
transfer mechanisms. 304  More recently, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) expressed that it has no intention to 
prevent screen scraping.305  
While screen scraping financial accounts appears unrestricted, there 
is some uncertainty about liability. In contrast to the European 
Union/United Kingdom’s liability framework for PSD II, which shifts the 
burden to service providers and requires that consumers receive a refund 
except in limited circumstances,306 Australia does not yet have a specific 
regime in place to allocate liability in the Open Banking ecosystem.307 The 
more general ePayments Code may find it challenging to accommodate 
screen scraping practices. In providing their login details to a TPP for 
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screen scraping, a consumer could be in breach of security requirements 
and potentially lose their protection under the Code, thus becoming liable 
for any losses that occur. 308  This was identified as an issue in the 
government’s Review Into Open Banking, which observed that it is 
“debatable whether all customers are aware of precisely what they’ve done 
in providing their login details in this way,” with the style of some requests 
ensuring that “customers might not even be aware they have given their 
login details to someone other than their bank.”309 
Given such issues and the mandate on banks to provide data access, 
consumer groups have made arguments in favor of banning screen scraping. 
They argue that such practices run counter to every other piece of 
government security advice, 310  undermine the consumer data right’s 
goals,311 and could result in consumer liability for loss.312 Further, it would 
provide little incentive for some Fintech players to seek accreditation if 
they could instead rely on screen scraping with financially vulnerable 
people, thus continuing to engage with non-CDR accredited entities bound 
by lower privacy protections.313 This could potentially create a “two-tiered” 
Fintech system and undermine the CDR regime’s success in ensuring 
consumer protection and confidence.314 On the other hand, Fintech groups 
have pointed to the possible anti-competitive effects associated with a 
screen scraping ban, with such a ban only seeming feasible when the CDR 
regime has matured.315 This is especially so considering that the Australian 
economy heavily relies on screen scraping as a cost-effective tool.316 The 
government review has also noted its role as an “important market-based 
check” on the design of the CDR framework.317 
Overall, while it seems like screen scraping is legal as a technique 
running parallel to the CDR scheme, it is controversial and could be subject 
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to change, with various stakeholders arguing for or against a ban.318 There 
is also uncertainty as to liability associated with the practice.319 
CONCLUSION 
Screen scraping has emerged as a major legal battlefield in the age 
of big data. Built upon the comparative approach, this article maps out the 
trajectory of relevant laws and jurisprudence in the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Australia and critically examines and demonstrates the 
nuanced divergence in how screen scraping could be treated in five issue 
areas—“digital trespass” statutes, tort law, intellectual property, 
contractual rights, and privacy and data protection—differently in these 
three common law jurisdictions. Despite the divergences, the recent Open 
Banking movement could help moderate the concerns about screen 
scraping, thereby bringing some level of convergence. To the extent that 
Open Banking mandates or facilitates data sharing, it can reduce the need 
for screen scraping. This is especially so in the United Kingdom/European 
Union context—and even more so if the United Kingdom’s Smart Data 
initiative expands these data-sharing principles beyond the financial sector. 
 By contrast, it is much less clear in the United States, for it lags in 
terms of Open Banking. Australia sits somewhere in the middle: it has a 
comprehensive CDR regime that could theoretically reduce the need for 
screen scraping but given the fact that it imposes no ban on the practice, it 
has a loophole for data miners to work around the new regime and continue 
scraping data. 
 In short, with the emerging trend of data sharing, one could witness 
a sea change in the screen scraping legal landscape. Insofar as data sharing 
schemes enable information flow between entities, one would expect some 
level of convergence. Such a convergence, however, is qualified by the 
institutional design of data sharing schemes—whether or not it explicitly 
 
318  FinTech Australia, Submission No 19, supra note 316, at 35 (“[T]he government should 
acknowledge that screen scraping provides a secure, economical, accessible and accepted system by 
which fintechs can and do seek information.”); Raiz Invest, Submission No 29 to Senate Select 
Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into 
the FinTech and RegTech Sectors (Dec. 24, 2019) 5, https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=
2bc13fcf-d9d4-4258-922c-563068d8092b&subId=676435 (“[S]creen scraping needs to remain a valid 
data collection method for the foreseeable future for many reasons from reducing fraud in the BECS 
system, to facilitating start-ups delivering products to the Australian market, and providing an alternative 
to Open Banking to level the competitive issues created by the CDR.”); Steve Brown, Submission No 13 
to Senate Select Committee on Financial Technology and Regulatory Technology, Parliament of 
Australia, Inquiry into the FinTech and RegTech Sectors (Dec. 19, 2019) 2, 
https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=ddbd95ba-88a0-4693-885e-
935b27991048&subId=675308 (“DDC is a critical mechanism to empower consumers and facilitate 
competition, valued by consumers, is secure and cost-effective, and is making a significant contribution 
to the competitive dynamics in the current market.”). 
319  See Brookes, supra note 261 (The Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s acting 
executive director of financial services recently told a Senate Committee that there is “no evidence of 
which we’re aware of any consumer loss from screen scraping . . . .”). 
62 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 30 NO. 1 
addresses screen scraping (as in the case of Australia and the United 
Kingdom) and whether there is a top-down, government-mandated data 
sharing regime (as in the case of the United States). 
